It has been suggested that a key solution to NN concerns would be to have networks disclosure what blocking or discriminatory behavior they engage in. [Atkinson ("Congress should require broadband providers to state their broadband access and usage
policies in clear terms.")] [Marsden Sec. 1.2.1 Types of Content Discrimination: Transparency Failures]
This solution was endorsed by the FCC's NRIC and the IETF. It was also a part of FCC Ch. Powell's Four Freedoms, but was subsequently dropped in FCC Ch. Martin's Broadband Principles.
A few networks already make these disclosures. See Ports for a list of existing Port-Blocking policies.
In additional, it has been recommended that a useful endeavor would be to create a baseline of network discriminatory behavior (both good and bad) which exists for such things as network management, security, and network operations.
[FTC Staff Report 2007 p 58: A related concern expressed by some network neutrality proponents is that last mile
ISPs might not disclose to end users the ISPs' differential treatment of certain data
and that they will be able to get away with such non-disclosure due to a lack of viable
competitive alternatives in the marketplace or the difficulty of tracing problems to ISPs' practices. Proponents also suggest that, to the extent that such disclosures are made by
ISPs, many end users will not be able to readily understand them, making such disclosures ineffective in checking potential ISP misconduct.262 Some network neutrality
proponents also argue that the use of data packet inspection and other traffic analysis
technologies by network operators may give rise to privacy concerns that end users might
not readily recognize.
Providing disclosure of networks acceptable use policies and network management has historical precedent. Both NSFNET and ARPANet had AUP's which indicated what was and was not appropriate activity over the Net. Standards and protocols are disclosed through RFCs of the Internet Engineering Task Force.
Applications are written to those publicly disclosed standards of the IETF. To put it simply, the design of the Internet was to have applications designed to function over TCP/IP instead of having applications function over a particular physical network. There is not one application that works over fiber networks and a different one over cable networks. Applications work over TCP/IP and TCP/IP interacts with the underlying physical networks. See the Internet Hourglass. Assuming the network is implementing TCP/IP, the application that conforms with the protocols should work. When the network alters the public TCP/IP protocols, the applications may no longer work. Only a network that deviates from the public standards will know its deviation and is in a position of informing the public of this deviation (in other words, the application is not in a position of disclosing "may not work of network X" as the application assumes the networks implements IETF TCP/IP).
Opponents argue that full disclosure of network management principals would provide bad guys with a road map on how to defeat those security features.
