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CyberSecurity

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Crimes Over Network
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- - Phishing
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- Offensive Words

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There is no doubt that as individuals, as businesses, and as a nation as a whole, we are increasingly at risk if we choose to do nothing in the face of our growing infrastructure vulnerabilities. These risks are real.  We don't need to wait for a catastrophe to occur - indeed we must not allow a catastrophe to occur - in order to recognize that much work needs to be done. - Ronald L. Dick, Director US National Infrastructure Protection Center  September 5, 2001

Derived From: Public and Private Entities Face Challenges in Addressing Cyber Threats, GAO-07-705 (June 2007)

What is cyberspace?
National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-54/HSPD23) defines cyberspace as the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, and includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical industries. Common usage of the term also refers to the virtual environment of information and interactions between people. [2009 Review]
"Cybercrime is a threat to U.S. national economic and security interests. Various studies and expert opinion estimate the direct economic impact from cybercrime to be in the billions of dollars annually. The annual loss due to computer crime was estimated to be $67.2 billion for U.S. organizations, according to a 2005 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) survey. The estimated losses associated with particular crimes include $49.3 billion in 2006 for identity theft and $1 billion annually due to phishing. These projected losses are based on direct and indirect costs that may include actual money stolen, estimated cost of intellectual property stolen, and recovery cost of repairing or replacing damaged networks and equipment. In addition, there is concern about threats that nation-states and terrorists pose to our national security through attacks on our computer-reliant critical infrastructures and theft of our sensitive information. For example, according to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission report, Chinese military strategists write openly about exploiting the vulnerabilities created by the U.S. military's reliance on advanced technologies and the extensive infrastructure used to conduct operations. Also, according to FBI testimony, terrorist organizations have used cybercrime to raise money to fund their activities. Despite the reported loss of money and information and known threats from adversaries, there remains a lack of understanding about the precise magnitude of cybercrime and its impact because cybercrime is not always detected or reported (cybercrime reporting is discussed further in our challenges section).

"Numerous public and private entities (federal agencies, state and local law enforcement, industry, and academia) have individual and collaborative responsibilititelephonetelephonees to protect against, detect, investigate, and prosecute cybercrime. The Departments of Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), and Defense (DOD), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have prominent roles in addressing cybercrime within the federal government. DOJ's FBI and DHS's U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service) are key federal organizations with responsibility for investigating cybercrime. State and local law enforcement organizations also have key responsibilities in addressing cybercrime. Private entities-Internet service providers, security vendors, software developers, and computer forensics vendors-focus on developing and implementing technology systems to protect against computer intrusions, Internet fraud, and spam and, if a crime does occur, detecting it and gathering evidence for an investigation. In addition, numerous partnerships have been established between public sector entities, between public and private sector entities, and internationally to address various aspects of cybercrime. For example, the Cyber Initiative and Resource Fusion Unit is a partnership established among federal law enforcement, academia, and industry to analyze cybercrime and determine its origin and how to fight it.

"Federal and state governments and other nations have enacted laws that apply to cybercrime and the legal recourse or remedies available. In addition, there are international agreements to improve the laws across nations and international cooperation on addressing cybercrime. Some federal statutes address specific types of cybercrime, while other federal statutes address both traditional crime and cybercrime."

Derived From: CRS Report (Mar 2009) "In January 2008, the Bush Administration initiated the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (the CNCI) to make the United States more secure against cyber threats. The Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 and National Security Presidential Directive 54 establishing the CNCI are classified. Some details of the Initiative have been made public in Departmental press releases, speeches by executive branch leaders, and analysis and insight offered by individuals that follow cyber security and terrorism related issues. The CNCI “establishes the policy, strategy, and guidelines to secure federal systems.”2 The CNCI also delineates “an approach that anticipates future cyber threats and technologies, and requires the federal government to integrate many of its technical and organizational capabilities to better address sophisticated threats and vulnerabilities.”3 Subsequent to the issuance of the classified directives, congressional committees have held hearings regarding the CNCI and heard testimony from a commission established to address necessary cybersecurity reforms.

"Few details have been publicly released regarding the implementation activities or status of CNCI efforts since the establishment of the initiative. According to one media account, Steven Chabinsky, Deputy Director of the Joint Interagency Cyber Task Force for the Office of the DNI, stated at an information technology security conference that there are 12 objectives supporting the Initiative’s goal of comprehensively addressing the nation’s cyber security concerns. They are:

1. Move towards managing a single federal enterprise network;
2. Deploy intrinsic detection systems;
3. Develop and deploy intrusion prevention tools;
4. Review and potentially redirect research and funding;
5. Connect current government cyber operations centers;
6. Develop a government-wide cyber intelligence plan;
7. Increase the security of classified networks;
8. Expand cyber education;
9. Define enduring leap-ahead technologies;
10. Define enduring deterrent technologies and programs;
11. Develop multi-pronged approaches to supply chain risk management; and
12. Define the role of cyber security in private sector domains.

Threats    Agency [REVISE THESE LINKS]
Threats Against the Network

Worms, Viruses, Attacks

Hacks

DOS

Vulnerabilities

Whitehouse
- Office Science and Technology Policy
- Homeland Security Council
- National Security Council
- Office of Management and Budget (Fed Information Security FISMA)

DHS Lead Agency (Prevention, Alerts, Info Sharing, Recovery)
- NCSD (Prevention, Alerts, Info Sharing, Recovery)
- - US CERT (Prevention, Alerts, Info Sharing, Recovery)
- - - National Control Systems Center
- - - National Cyber Response Coordination Group (NCRCG)
- - - Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program
- - - Cyber Warning and Information Network CWIN
- - NCS (Prevention, Alerts, Info Sharing, Recovery)
- - Cyberstorm game
- Secret Service (investigation, enforcement)
- Partner: NIST ANTD Internet Infrastructure Protection

DOJ (enforcement, investigation)
- FBI (investigation)
- Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (investigation, prosecution)

DOD
- DISA
- - Partner: NIST ANTD Internet Infrastructure Protection
- CERT (funding) (Prevention, Alerts, Info Sharing, Recovery)
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
- Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering
- NSA (crypto)

DOC
- NIST
- - Computer Security Division
- - Advanced Network Technologies Division
- - - Internet Infrastructure Protection (DNSSEC, BGP Sec, Reliability, IPSEC)
- - Critical Infrastructure Protection Grants (funding for R&D)
- NTIA
- - Critical Infrastructure Protection
- - DNS

NSA
- Partner: NIST ANTD Internet Infrastructure Protection

CIA

NSF (funding for R&D)

Cyberwar DoD
Telecommunications

FCC
- NRIC (reliability, Best Practices)
- NORS Network Outage Reporting System
- DIRS Disaster Information Reporting Systm
- E911
- EAS Emergency Alert System
- CMAS Commercial Mobile Alert System
- TSP Telecommunications Service Priority
- WPS Wireless Priority Service

White House
- Office of Management and Budget (Fed Information Security FISMA)

DHS
- NCSD
- - NCS

Threats Over the Network
Spam

FTC (Prevention, Consumer Info, Info Gathering, Enforcement)

DOJ (Enforcement)

FCC (SMS Spam - Prevention, Enforcement)

White House
- Office of Management and Budget (Fed Information Security FISMA)

Fraud

FTC (Prevention, Consumer Info, Info Gathering, Enforcement)

DOJ (Enforcement)

White House
- Office of Management and Budget (Fed Information Security FISMA)

ID Theft

FTC (Prevention, Consumer Info, Info Gathering, Enforcement)

DOJ (Enforcement)

White House
- Office of Management and Budget (Fed Information Security FISMA)

Offensive Content on the Internet

DOJ (Enforcement)

FCC (Erate Condition: CIPA)

DHS
- Customs

Gambling DOJ (Enforcement)
eMedicine, Drugs

DOJ (Enforcement)
- FDA

FTC (Fraud, Consumer Info)

Alcohol Tobacco Sales DOJ (Enforcement)
- ATF
Hacks to Personal Computers

DOJ (Enforcement)
- Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section
- FBI

White House
- Office of Management and Budget (Fed Information Security FISMA)

CyberStalking DOJ (Enforcement)
- FBI
Financial, Investing

DOJ (Enforcement)
- FBI

DHS
- Secret Service

Illegal Wiretaps DOJ (Enforcement)
- FBI
- Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section
Research NITRD

Hearings & Reports

Laws

  • Child Protection Laws
  • Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 18 USC 2030
  • Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA)
    • "FISMA establishes clear criteria to improve federal agencies' cybersecurity programs. Enacted into law on December 17, 2002, as title III of the EGovernment Act of 2002, FISMA requires federal agencies to protect and maintain the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their information and information systems.5 It also assigns specific information security responsibilities to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), agency heads, chief information officers (CIO), and inspectors general (IG). For OMB, these responsibilities include developing and overseeing the implementation of policies, principles, standards, and guidelines on information security, as well as reviewing, at least annually, and approving or disapproving, agency information security programs. FISMA required each agency including agencies with national security systems, to develop, document, and implement agencywide information security programs to provide information security for the information and information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency, including those provided or managed by another agency, contractor, or other source. Specifically, this program is to include
      • "periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information or information systems;
      • "risk-based policies and procedures that cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level and ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each information system;
      • subordinate plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems or groups of information systems;
      • security awareness training for agency personnel, including contractors and other users of information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency;
      • periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, performed with frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency's required inventory of major information systems;
      • a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the agency;
      • procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents; and
      • plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency.
    • "FISMA requires each agency to report annually to OMB, selected congressional committees, and the Comptroller General on the adequacy of information security policies, procedures, and practices, and on compliance with FISMA's requirements.
    • "FISMA also charges the Director of OMB with ensuring the operation of a central federal information security incident center with responsibility for issuing guidance to agencies on detecting and responding to incidents. Other responsibilities include compiling and analyzing information about incidents and informing agencies about current and potential information security threats. Prior to FISMA, the CIO Council (then chaired by OMB's Deputy Director for Management) issued a memorandum to all agency CIOs instructing agencies to follow specific practices for appropriate coordination and interaction with the Federal Computer Incident Response Capability (FedCIRC).6 OMB's statutory requirement supported FedCIRC, and OMB received quarterly reports from FedCIRC on the federal government's status on information technology security incidents.
    • "Following the establishment of DHS and in an effort to implement action items described in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, FedCIRC was dissolved as a separate entity and its functions absorbed into the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), which was created in September 2003. US-CERT was established to aggregate and disseminate cybersecurity information to improve warning about and response to incidents, increase coordination of response information, reduce vulnerabilities, and enhance prevention and protection. US-CERT analyzes incidents reported by federal civilian agencies and coordinates with national security incident response centers in responding to incidents on both classified and unclassified systems. US-CERT also provides a service through its National Cyber Alert System to identify, analyze, prioritize, and disseminate information on emerging vulnerabilities and threats."
    • "FISMA also requires NIST to establish standards, guidelines, and requirements to help agencies improve the posture of their information security programs.9 NIST has issued several publications relevant to assisting agencies in protecting their systems against emerging cybersecurity threats. For instance, Special Publication 800-61, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, advises agencies to establish an incident-response capability that includes establishing guidelines for communicating with outside parties regarding incidents, including law enforcement agencies, and also discusses handling specific types of incidents, including malicious code and unauthorized access. Additionally, NIST Special Publication 800-68 (Draft), Guidance for Securing Microsoft Windows XP Systems for IT Professionals: A NIST Security Configuration Checklist, describes configuration recommendations that focus on deterring malware, countermeasures against security threats with malicious payload, and specific recommendations for addressing spyware." [GAO 2005 p 9, 14]
  • Fraud in Connection with Access Devices 18 USC 1029
  • ID Documents Fraud 18 USC 1028
  • Wire Fraud 18 USC 1343
  • Federal Trade Commission Act 15 USC 45
  • Can Spam Act 15 U.S.C. § 7701, 18 U.S.C. § 1037
  • USA Patriot Act

White House

"The Administration already has established an Information and Communications Infrastructure Interagency Policy Committee (ICI-IPC), chaired by the National Security Council (NSC) and Homeland Security Council (HSC),19 as the primary policy coordination body for issues related to achieving an assured, reliable, secure, and survivable global information and communications infrastructure and related capabilities." [2009 Review 7]

White House has proposed the position of a Cybersecurity Czar / Coordinator

"The President should consider appointing a cybersecurity policy official at the White House, reporting to the NSC and dual-hatted with the NEC, to coordinate the Nation's cybersecurity-related policies and activities. This individual would chair the ICI-IPC and lead a strong process in consultation with other elements of the EOP to resolve competing priorities and coordinate interagency development of policies and strategies for cybersecurity.20 The cybersecurity policy official should participate in all appropriate economic, counterterrorism, and science and technology policy discussions to inform them of cybersecurity perspectives.

"To be successful, the President's cybersecurity policy official must have clear presidential support, authority, and sufficient resources to operate effectively in policy formulation and the coordination of interagency cybersecurity-related activities. The cybersecurity policy official should be supported by at least two Senior Directors and appropriate staff from the NSC and at least one Senior Director and appropriate staff from the NEC. These directorates would report through the cybersecurity policy official and work together in pursuit of the goals set forth in this paper and established as national policy. In addition, to achieve additional scale and integration across the NSC, each NSC regional and functional directorate should designate an individual to be responsible for following cybersecurity-related issues in the directorate's portfolio and coordinating with the directorate for cybersecurity.

"The cybersecurity policy official should not have operational responsibility or authority, nor the authority to make policy unilaterally. Using interagency coordination processes, the cybersecurity policy official should harmonize cybersecurity-related policy and technology efforts across the Federal government, ensure that the President's budget reflects federal priorities for cybersecurity, and develop a legislative agenda, all in consultation with the Federal government's Chief Technology Officer and Chief Information Officer-along with the appropriate entities within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and the NEC.

"This appointment also would make crisis management more effective by establishing the cybersecurity policy official as the White House action officer for cyber incident response (a similar role to the action officers who help the White House monitor terrorist attacks or natural disasters); departments and agencies would continue to perform their operational roles.

"To facilitate coordination, all federal departments and agencies should establish a point-of-contact in their respective executive suites authorized to interface with the White House on cybersecurityrelated issues.

"The cybersecurity policy official-through the interagency policy development process-should prepare for the President's consideration an updated national strategy to secure the information and communications infrastructure. The strategy should include continued evaluation of CNCI activities and build, where appropriate, on its successes.24 The national strategy should focus senior leadership attention and time toward resolving issues that hamper U.S. efforts to achieve an assured, reliable, secure, and resilient global information and communications infrastructure and related capabilities.25 The strategy would assist government efforts to raise public awareness, renew and build international alliances and public-private partnerships, establish a more comprehensive national cyber response and recovery plan, and promote an aggressive research and development agenda that has the potential to result in new technologies that will enhance cybersecurity.

"The Federal government should continue the principle of "mission bridging" started under the CNCI. Departments and agencies should expand the sharing of expertise, knowledge, and perspectives about threats, tradecraft, technology, and vulnerabilities between network defenders and the intelligence, military, and law enforcement organizations that develop U.S. operational capabilities in cyberspace. In addition, the cybersecurity policy official should help coordinate intelligence and military policies and strategies for cyberspace-including for countering terrorist use of the Internet-to ensure integration of all mission equities.The cybersecurity policy official should engage external advisory bodies. Many advisory bodies touch on cybersecurity-related issues, including the National Security and Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC), the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC), the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC), and the Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board (ISPAB). The cybersecurity policy official should review the responsibilities of these bodies and propose changes as necessary to optimize advice and eliminate unnecessary duplication.

"Other structures will be needed to help ensure that civil liberties and privacy rights are protected. Such structures would signal transparency and build trust between the civil liberties and privacy community, the public, and the program for cybersecurity, especially if implemented from the outset.26 It is important to reconstitute the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), accelerate the selection process for its board members, and consider whether to seek legislative amendments to broaden its scope to include cybersecurity-related issues.27 Other options include: facilitating regular engagement of government civil liberties and privacy advisors on policy matters for cybersecurity or designating a dedicated privacy and civil liberties officer within the NSC (or, more broadly, the EOP) to engage with the private-sector civil liberties and privacy community, an oversight board, and government civil liberties and privacy officers.28, 29

"Equally important to developing cybersecurity policy, is assuring the effective execution and implementation of that policy to meet the goals of the larger strategy. Accordingly, the cybersecurity policy official, in consultation with OMB and other EOP entities, will need to ensure effective implementation of cybersecurity-related policy and activities. During the course of the 60-day review, stakeholders suggested a variety of options to coordinate and oversee cybersecurity activities. Several commentators identified strong executive leadership as well as focused, multi-year attention across the participating departments and agencies as critical elements to ensure that the U.S. Government has the mechanisms needed for an effective cybersecurity program. Currently, some of these oversight functions for existing cybersecurity efforts are being performed outside of the EOP. For example, the Joint Interagency Cyber Task Force (JIACTF), under the Director of National Intelligence, currently is responsible for coordinating and monitoring the implementation of the CNCI. The cybersecurity policy official, in consultation with OMB and other EOP entities, should develop structural options to perform appropriate oversight, implementation, and other functions. These could include among others, developing a JIACTF-like function30 in OMB or elsewhere in the EOP, creating an entity similar to President Eisenhower's Operations Coordinating Board,31 or establishing some other entity that, among other things, assists in assessing department and agency performance and oversees federal compliance with cybersecurity standards. Unless and until such an office is established, the work of the JIACTF should continue.32" [2009 Review 7]

Other Govt Activity

Cybersecurity Research

NITRD Sept 22, 2009 (In response to the President's call to secure our nation's cyber infrastructure, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the Federal Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) Program developed the Leap-Ahead Initiative with the goal of developing the national cyber security leap-ahead research and development agenda. Between August 17th and 19th of this year, the NITRD Program, with guidance from OSTP and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense Networks and Information Integration, held a National Cyber Leap Year Summit in Arlington, Virginia.)

  • National Cyber Leap Year Summit 2009 Co-Chairs Report: download
  • National Cyber Leap Year Summit 2009 Participants' Ideas Report: download

Links

Papers

  • An Economic Map of Cybercrime - Alvaro Cardenas, University of California-Berkeley, John Chuang, University of California-Berkeley, Jens Grossklags, University of California-Berkeley, Svetlana Radosavac, DOCOMO Communications Labratories USA, Inc., Chris Hoofnagle,University of California-Berkeley TPRC 2009
  • Bauer, Johannes M. and Van Eeten, Michel (2009) "Cybersecurity: stakeholder incentives, externalities, and policy options", Telecommunications Policy, 33(10-11)
  • Van Eeten, Michel J. G. and Bauer, Johannes M. (2009) "Megacrises and the internet: risks, incentives and externalities", Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, forthcoming.
  • Melissa Hathaway, Cyber Security – An Economic and National Security Crisis, Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies, Fall 2008 at 31-6.

News & Blogs

 

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