- FCC Net Neutrality BitTorrent Proceeding
- Open Access
- Comcast / Level3 Intercon Dispute
- Comcast / Cogent Intercon dispute
- Comcast / Netflix Intercon Dispute
- - TWC
- - NBCU
- - Adelphia
- - AT&T Broadband
- Data Caps
- "In May 2012, Comcast announced that it is experimenting with different approaches to data caps and usage pricing through trials in some markets but for all markets raised the existing data cap from 250 GB to 300 GB per month.932 In the markets where Comcast is not experimenting with usage based pricing, it has suspended enforcement of its data caps." FCC Annual Video Competition Report 2013
- Comcast: 250 Gb per month cap. Articulated network management plans in disclosure to FCC pursuant to order. [Bode 082808]
- Comcast / NBCU: Para 94: "To address these transaction-related concerns, the Applicants have offered a number of voluntary commitments. The Applicants have agreed that, in their provision of broadband Internet access services, neither Comcast nor Comcast-NBCU shall prioritize affiliated Internet content over unaffiliated Internet content. In addition, any Comcast or Comcast-NBCU broadband Internet access service offering that involves caps, tiers, metering, or other usage-based pricing shall not treat affiliated network traffic differently from unaffiliated network traffic. Comcast and Comcast-NBCU shall also comply with all relevant FCC rules, including the rules adopted by the Commission in GN Docket No. 09-191, and, in the event of any judicial challenge affecting the latter, Comcast-NBCU’s voluntary commitments concerning adherence to those rules will be in effect."
IETF RFC 6057, Comcast's Protocol-Agnostic Congestion Management System (Dec. 2010) ("This document describes the congestion management system of Comcast Cable, a large cable broadband Internet Service Provider (ISP) in the U.S. Comcast completed deployment of this congestion management system on December 31, 2008.") Following an August 2008 FCC document [FCC_Memo_Opinion] regarding how Comcast managed congestion on its High-Speed Internet ("HSI") network, Comcast disclosed to the FCC [FCC_Net_Mgmt_Response] and the public additional technical details of the congestion management system that it intended to and did implement by the end of 2008 [FCC_Congest_Mgmt_Ltr], including the thresholds involved in this new System
"1. Software installed in the Comcast network continuously examines aggregate traffic usage data for individual segments of Comcast's HSI network. If overall upstream or downstream usage on a particular segment of Comcast's HSI network reaches a pre-determined level, the software moves on to step two.
2. At step two, the software examines bandwidth usage data for subscribers in the affected network segment to determine which subscribers are using a disproportionate share of the bandwidth. If the software determines that a particular subscriber or subscribers have been the source of high volumes of network traffic during a recent period of minutes, traffic originating from that subscriber or those subscribers temporarily will be assigned a lower priority status.
3. During the time that a subscriber's traffic is assigned the lower priority status, their packets will not be delayed or dropped so long as the network segment is not actually congested. If, however, the network segment becomes congested, their packets could be intermittently delayed or dropped.
4. The subscriber's traffic returns to normal priority status once his or her bandwidth usage drops below a set threshold over a particular time interval.
Broadband Internet, Interconnection & Backbone
In 2001, Comcast broadband Internet service was a loose confederation of local and regional networks, with backbone transit service provided by third parties such as AT&T, Savvis, and Level 3. [CAIDA] [See Comcast AtHome Network (noting 1996 Comcast agreement to join @Home; @Home backbone provided service to Comcast)]
In 2002, AT&T divided its business operations into AT&T Wireless, AT&T Business and AT&T Broadband, intending to spin off the AT&T Broadband internet access service. AT&T and Comcast announced that Comcast (the third largest cable Internet company) would acquired AT&T broadband (the largest cable Internet company). In 2006, Comcast would expand its broadband Internet service further through the acquisition of Adelphia.
Comcast argued in its AT&T Broadband merger application that the unified Comcast broadband internet service could negotiate discounted wholesale transit service from vendors. [Comcast / AT&T Application at 34 ("the increased level of Internet traffic resulting from combining the two companies’ broadband operations will allow AT&T Comcast to take advantage of volume discounts in buying Internet backbone services to transport customer Internet traffic.")] AT&T Business, which included the AT&T Internet backbone, would provide the new Comcast company with backbone transit service. [Comcast / AT&T Application at 17 n. 24 (stating that AT&T broadband has entered into an agreement with AT&T for the provision of Internet backbone service. "AT&T Broadband has entered into four principal network services agreements with AT&T: (1) a Master Carrier Agreement that reflects the market-based rates, terms and conditions on which AT&T Business Services will, inter alia, sell long distance services to AT&T Broadband for resale, terminate traffic outside of AT&T Broadband’s service area, and provide “administrative services” for internal AT&T Broadband usage,… In addition, AT&T Broadband and AT&T have entered into a High Speed Internet Services Binding Term Sheet that reflects the rates, terms and conditions on which AT&T will provide managed IP layer services, support and maintenance, and specified subscriber functionalities (such as Internet search and navigation tools) to support AT&T Broadband in its provision of high-speed Internet services to its subscribers.")] [Brodkin 2014 ("As part of [the 2002 purchase of AT&T Broadband], Comcast purchased transit from AT&T for a few years after the transaction. But with the costly contract expiring in the mid-2000s “and because no one company could support the infrastructure needs of our business,” Comcast decided to build its own backbone, Tishgart said.")][CAIDA] Typical of end-user access networks, Comcast's traffic ratio balanced in 2007 favored downloaded traffic over uploaded traffic. [Labowitz 20]
After the merger with AT&T, Comcast was significantly larger but still be reliant on third party transit service. Comcast, therefore, had an incentive to build its own backbone network in order to avoid paying a third party (and potential competititor) for transit service and in order to unify its network. The backbone could also be leveraged for MVPD video delivery and telephony service. [Labowitz (2007 lacked a nationwide network backbone; highly dependent on upstream transit)] [Werbach (predicting that Comcast would need to merge with a backbone network to compete with other access networks that had backbones)] [Saxena 10 ("The backbone interconnects regional networks to create a unified national network" listing benefit as reducing "transport payments to transit providers")] [Schanz Slide 10] [Vik]
Work on the Comcast backbone (ASN 7922) was initiated in 2003. [Vik] Comcast acquired dark fiber from Level 3 and equipment from CISCO. [Vik at 6 (equipment from Nortel)] [Comcast Press Release 2004] [CISCO] Comcast's backbone went online in 2006, interconnecting a few networks. [CAIDA] [Schanz Slide 10] [Vik] In 2007, Comcast's backbone tied together its local networks, linking 23 Comcast ASNs. Comcast published a peering policy [Comcast Settlement-Free Interconnection (SFI) Policy (first archived by Archive.org on June 12, 2008)] and advertised "Wholesale Dedicated IP Transit Service." [Comcast Dedicated IP Transit (first archived by Archive.org on March 12, 2010)]
In 2008, the Comcast tested its 100G backbone. [Vik Evolutin at 11] In 2008, CAIDA's data shows that Comcast had __ transit customers. By 2009, "Comcast is significantly different." It has become a "net contributor of Internet traffic" and the "6th largest origin / transit ASN by volume." [Labowitz 19]
Comcast's backbone network generally had four different types of interconnection arrangements with other networks:
- A transit vendor to enterprises, local networks, academic networks, and end users;
- A transit consumer of Level 3 and then Tata for end points that it was not directly connected with, especially international traffic;
- A settlement free peer with other backbone networks; and
- An Access Paid Peering vendor for content networks.
Backbone Transit Vendors
Comcast no longer purchased transit service for its local networks from AT&T. [CAIDA] [Netflix] Transit service is now provided to the Comcast local networks by Comcast's backbone. Comcast's backbone was not Tier 1 and did not have full Internet reach, especially internationally. In order to reach destinations on networks that it did not peer with, Comcast's backbone initially acquired upstream transit service from Level 3 and then from Tata. [CAIDA] [Brodkin 2014 ("Comcast has built a large enough network of its own that it now peers with the Tier 1 companies. It does buy transit, but for less than one percent of its overall traffic load. That mostly addresses the small amount of traffic coming to and from overseas, Tishgart said.")]. As Comcast arranges additional peering relationships with other networks, it can continue to reduce its need for transit service and therefore transit costs.
With transit service from Level 3 and Tata, Comcast did not need additional transit service from other backbones; these interconnection relationships gave Comcast full Internet reach. If, however, Comcast negotiated peering arrangements with other backbone networks, it could improve its connectivity and quality of service, and reduce its transit costs.
The third party backbone services were in the business of selling transit. They would like to sell transit to Comcast, but Comcast already had transit vendors and was reducing its need for transit. They also sold transit to other networks. Comcast had become so large that directly connecting to Comcast could become a business advantage. Directly connecting with Comcast would reduce the number of hops required for traffic to go through, would improve connectivity, and would improve quality of service. Comcast had become such a large destination on the Internet that if ACME network directly interconnected with Comcast, but BETA network did not, ACME would be at a significant advantage over BETA.
In short order, backbone networks began to enter into peering arrangements with Comcast. These settlement free peering arrangements reportedly contained balanced traffic ratios; the backbone network could only download as much traffic as it uploaded. This in theory prevented the backbone networks from taking on heavy content customers attempting to reach Comcast, essentially acting as CDNs. Comcast interconnected with domestic backbone networks as follows [CAIDA]:
- 2006: Level 3 (Transit provider, 2006-2012; peering, 2013-present) [Norton]
- GTT (peering)
- Seabone (peering)
- 2008: Cogent (peering)
- AT&T (peering)
- Tata (transit provider) [Norton]
- Sprint (peering)
- Zayo (peering)
- Centurylink (peering)
- Time Warner Cable (peering)
- Verizon (transit provider for three years, then peering)
- NTT (peering) [Brodkin 2014]
- Hurricane Electric (peering)
- XO (peering)
Comcast 7922 also became an attractive peering opportunity for other networks such as Internet2 (academic), ISC (infrastructure), MERIT (academic, research) and ___. COMCAST CITATION
CONTENT ACCESS PAID PEERING
Content providers are in the business of providing content to access network's end users. The larger an access network, the greater percentage of a content provider's business plan an access network represents. For example, if an access network provides access to 24% of end users in a market, than that access network provides access to 24% of a content provider's potential business plan.
A Content Delivery Network is in the business of delivering content from the content provider to the access network. The larger an access network, the stronger the incentive to have quality connectivity to that network. If an access network represents 1% of the market, it may not be justifiable for the CDN to build out infrastructure to meet that access network. But if an access network is one of the largest access networks with 24% of the market, the CDN has an incentive to arrange quality connectivity that it can turn arount and market to its customers.
Comcast invested in and built its backbone. All access networks have the incentive to be paid to receive traffic destined for their end users. Comcast was now so large that the value proposition of access to Comcast's end users was significant. Furthermore, with Comcast's backbone, Comcast now had the ability to control the supply of access capacity. In order for Comcast to be paid by CDNs for access to Comcast's end users, Comcast had to make sure that access to end users was not something that they could satisfactorily receive for free otherwise.
Comcast purchased transit capacity from Level 3 and Tata. However, when Level 3 attempted to sell access to Comcast to Netflix, a signficant interconnection dispute unfolded. Comcast then acquired transit service from Tata (with the obvious advantage of providing access to international markets that Comcast's domestic network lacked connectivity to). Reports indicated that the connectivity with Tata lacked sufficient spare capacity to handle the traffic demands of a large content provider such as Netflix.
Comcast entered into settlement free peering arrangements with backbone providers, with a balanced traffic ratio requirement (a provision not found in access networks' acquisition of transit service from backbone proviers where the traffic was traditionally balanced in the download direction). Since backbones could only download as much as they uploaded, and since end users generally downloaded more than they uploaded, these backbones could not use this interconnection capacity to market service as CDNs to content providers. If they did - if they sold service to, for instance, Netflix - the traffic ratio would be out of balance, utilization would exceed capacity, Comcast would refuse to augment capacity, and congestion would occur. This situation would persist until the backbone had either eliminated the content traffic or agreed to enter into a CDN access paid peering agreement with Comcast.
With capacity through transit vendors and peers controlled, Comcast could negotiate with CDN quality connectivity directly with Comcast's access networks. CDNs like Limelight, reported, made clear that they would not pay for access if they did not have to. But a CDN competing with Akamai which has superior connectivity to Comcast cannot afford to have congested connectivity. The competitive disadvantage would put the CDN out of the market. Therefore the CDN pays in order to have a quality of connectivity that it can then market to its customers.
Comcast's new network also became attractive to content delivery networks attemtpting to connect with end users. Connecting with Comcast 7922 meant interconnecting with Comcast relatively close to subscribers and outside the cacophony of commodity backbones. Content could be delivered efficiently and with a higher quality of service, attributes that CDNs could market to potential content customers. CDNs generally engaged in cold potato routing, delivering content at the gateway of the local Comcast network, as close to end users as possible, and thereby not using the Comcast backbone for long hault transport. Comcast 7922 interconnected with Akamai in a transit relationship starting in 2008. This relationship has also been described as a paid peering arrangement. [CAIDA] [Norton] [See Faratin] Comcast 7922 interconnected with Limelight 2010. It is reported that this was a paid peering relationship. [Norton] [CAIDA]
EDGECAST NETFLIX (DOES THAT CHART REFLECT OTHER PAID RELATIONSHIPS)
For content networks to prefer the paid interconnection routes to Comcast, there could not be an alternative substitute supply of settlement free interconnection capacity from interconnection with backbones. [Norton] [Netflix] As noted above, most backbones interconnection with Comcast on a settlement free basis with a balanced traffic ratio. They could only send as much traffic as they received, and thus they could not act as a route to Comcast for large content providers. If a backbone network did take on a large content provider as a customer attempting to send traffic to Comcast, utilization over interconnection links between the networks would increase and more capacity would be required. Because the traffic ratios were out of balance, Comcast would refuse to augment interconnection capacity. Without additional capacity but with growing demand, the interconnection links would become contested. This situation would persist until either the backbone network resolved its traffic imbalance (stopped acting like a CDN) or the backbone network entered into a CDN type arrangment with Comcast, paying to access Comcast's subscribers. As noted above, a few backbones (Level 3 and Tata) provided Comcast with transit service in order to ensure full Internet reach; as the customer, Comcast would order sufficient capacity in order to maintain global connectivity but not sufficient capacity to act as a substitute route to Comcast for large content providers. [See 2010 Interconnection Dispute between Netflix and Comcast].
- Our Network, Comcast.
- Benjamin Vik, Comcast Principal Transport Engineer, The Evolution of a Transport Network, NANOG 59 (2013),
- Benjamin Vik, Comcast, 100G Evolution at Comcast, NANOG 2013
- Shamim Akhtar, Sr. Director of Network Architecture & Technology , Comcast, 100G check point: When rubber meets the road... , NANOG 53 2011
- Vik Saxena, Ph.D., Sr. Director, Network Architecture, CTO Office, Comcast Cable, Bandwidth Drivers for 100G Ethernet (Jan. 2007)
- John Schanz, Executive Vice President, National Engineering and Technology Operations, Comcast Cable, Network and Technology May 1, 2007 [
- Dedicated Internet, Comcast (stating that Comcast's IP Backbone is ASN 7922)
- Alain Durand, Office of the CTO, Director - IPv6 Architect, IPv6 @ Comcast Managing 100+ Million IP Addresses, NANOG 37, Slide 13 (June 2006) ("News Flash: All Routers on Comcast IP Backbone are IPv6 Enabled - First PING on our 10GE production backbone... June 2")
- Comcast Press Release, Comcast Extends National Fiber Infrastructure Dec. 7, 2004 ("Comcast Corporation (Nasdaq: CMCSA, CMCSK) today announced a long-term agreement with Level 3 Communications, Inc. (Nasdaq: LVLT) to provide inter-city and metro dark fiber as part of Comcast's extension of its fiber footprint…. This backbone is principally based on 20-year dark-fiber IRU's (indefeasible rights of use) from Level 3 and other sources. ").
- Ciena Press Release, Comcast Upgrades to Ciena's Newest 100G Technology, January 17, 2013.
- Reply of Netflix, Inc., Application of Comcast Corporation and Time Warner Cable, Inc., MB Docket No. 14-57, p. 41 (Dec. 23, 2014).
- CISCO Press Release, With CISCO Services, Comcast Scales Its Commercial Metro Services and Company Reach, (2004 ) ("The company’s network spans more than 90,000 fiber-optic miles to deliver services in 41 states and 22 of the top 25 U.S.-metropolitan areas.")
- Ex Parte, Adam Rothchild, Vice President, Network Architecture, Voxel dot net, Comcast and NBC Universal Merger (MB Docket No. 10-56); Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices (GN Docket No. 09-191) (Jan. 11, 2011) ("Delivering traffic to Comcast over standard “best effort” paths, such as the transit circuits it purchases from Tata Communications, we have observed extreme packet loss for the majority of the day, dating back over six months. In these conditions, it is simply not possible for competing external providers to deliver VoIP, gaming, or streaming video services to Comcast’s broadband subscribers.");
- Peering disputes: Comcast, Level 3 and You, Internap Dec. 2, 2010, http://www.internap.com/2010/12/02/peering-disputes-comcast-level-3-and-you/ (Unattributed statements from Tata officials reported “[our] San Jose and New York links with Comcast are running full.”);
- Comcast Answers Today's Traffic Question, Comcast Voices Dec. 14, 2010, http://corporate.comcast.com/comcast-voices/comcast-answers-todays-traffic-question ("Trying to base a theory upon a snapshot of TATA ports in one market during a particular time period (assuming the graph is legitimate) paints a narrow, inaccurate picture. It hardly represents how the Internet functions or the capacity and varied paths between Comcast and many networks on the Internet.")
- Ex Parte of Cogent Communications Group, Dkt. 14-57 (Feb. 2, 2015) ("Comcast continues to purchase transit from Tata, but does not allow Tata to announce Cogent's routes. Cogent already peers with Tata. Accordingly, if Comcast allowed Cogent's routes to be announced by Tata, congestion between Cogent and Comcast would be relieved, since the relevant traffic would travel from Cogent to Tata to Comcast." )
- Netflix Petition, Comcast /TWC Merger, at 56. ("In 2013, congestion on Cogent's and Level 3's routes into Comcast's network steadily increased, reaching a level where it began to affect the performance of Netflix streaming for Comcast's customers.
FCC Inquiry 2014
- Sena Fitzmaurice, Comcast Statement on FCC Chairman Wheeler's ISP Interconnection Announcement, Comcast Voices (Jun 13, 2014) ("We welcome this review which will allow the Commission full transparency into the entire Internet backbone ecosystem and enable full education as to how this market works.")
Papers and Research
- CAIDA (data captured for December of each respective year)
- OTI, Beyond Frustrated, The Sweeping Consumer Harms as a Result of ISP Disputes, Nov. 2014
- Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together, and Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 343 (2008)
- William Norton, The Emerging 21st Century Access Power Peering, COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES, 84, 4th Q. 2011, p. 55.
- Peyman Faratin, David Clark, Staven Bauer, and William Lehr, Patrick Gilmore, Arthur Berger, The Growing Complexities of Internet Interconnection, No. 72, 4th Q. 2008, p. 60, Communications & Strategies (senior Akamai engineers supporting access paid peering)
- Craig Labovitz, Scott Lekel-Johnson, Danny McPherson, Jon Oberheide, Farnam Jahanian, Internet Inter-Domain Traffic, p. 29-80 2010 (“Discussions with analysts and ISPs provide some insight into Comcast’s transformation. Over the last five years, Comcast executed on a number of technology and business strategies, including consolidation of several disparate regional backbones into a single nationwide network and rollout of a “triple play” (voice, video, data) consumer product. Most significantly, Comcast began offering wholesale transit (GigE and 10GigE IP), cellular backhaul and IP video distribution (though Comcast Media Center subsidiary)”).
- Jon Brodkin, How Comcast Became a Powerful - and Controversial - Part of the Internet Backbone, Ars Technica (July 17, 2014) ("Comcast just started peering with Tier 1 network NTT a few months ago.")
- Todd Spangler, Comcast Paves Way for 400-Gig Backbone Links, Multichannel News (Jan. 17, 2013)
- C. Labovitz, S. Iekel-Johnson, D. McPherson, Arbor Networks, Inc., J. Oberheide, F. Jahanian, University of Michigan, M. Karir, Merit Network, Inc., Atlas Internet Observatory 2009 Annual Report, Slide 19 (presented at NANOG 37)
- Comcast launches nationwide long-haul IP/optical network, Lightwave Feb. 1, 2006.
Comcast / Time Warner Cable Merger 2015
Derived From: Remarks of Jon Sallet, Federal Communications Commission General Counsel, As Prepared for Delivery, Telecommunications Policy Research Conference: “The Federal Communications Commission and Lessons of Recent Mergers & Acquisitions Reviews” (Sept. 25, 2015)
there is no public record about the staff’s basic theoretical approach or the reasoning behind the staff’s view that the transactions should be subject to an administrative hearing that would compel a detailed factual record on which the Commission would then make its final decision. While the parties to the transaction were, with the Chairman’s concurrence, provided an explanation and an opportunity to respond to the staff analysis, there is a gap in the understanding of lawyers, economists and the public generally as to the staff’s core theoretical approach. Initial commentary has been presented in academic settings, but I’d like to use this gathering to also help fill in the gaps, with the understanding, of course, that confidential material cannot be publicly discussed and that, therefore, this discussion is necessarily incomplete.
The core facts of the Comcast transaction were these: Comcast – the nation’s largest cable company, Pay TV, and broadband provider – proposed to acquire Time Warner Cable, the second-largest cable company, fourth-largest MVPD, and third-largest broadband provider. The proposed transactions involved the acquisition of Time Warner’s cable systems serving approximately 12 million broadband and 11 million video customers, sale of certain systems to Charter, a swap between Comcast and Charter of certain other systems, and a spin-off of Comcast systems to a new cable company serving approximately 2.5 million subscribers. With the four proposed transactions, Comcast would acquire approximately 8.5 million additional broadband subscribers and approximately 7 million additional video subscribers, and significantly enhance its position in the top markets in the country.
Simply put, the core concern came down to whether the merged firm would have an increased incentive and ability to safeguard its integrated Pay TV business model and video revenues by limiting the ability of OVDs to compete effectively, especially through the use of new business models.
An OVD that seeks to successfully compete with a traditional cable system needs a few things. It needs programming. It needs access to broadband providers’ networks and it needs to be certain that, once delivered to those networks, its video traffic will find its way to the intended consumer. It may also need access to devices used by consumers. And, it needs to ensure that consumers are not dissuaded from using its OVD services because of retail broadband terms and conditions that might raise the price of online video in a discriminatory way. The AT&T commitment I described above addresses the potential for discrimination in the application of data caps, for example.
The portrait of OVD business models changed markedly during the pendency of the applications and these changes sharpened the focus on potential harms to the basic building blocks of OVD services. What must have seemed publicly as a series of high-profile conflicts between Netflix and large broadband providers in the winter and spring of 2014 gave way in the fall of that year and the early months of 2015 to a new phenomenon – the emergence of a variety of business models offering different flavors of OVD services. For example, DISH’s Sling service offered so-called linear programming of the same kind offered by Pay TV systems, including ESPN. Sony announced its plan to link the supply of programming to its popular gaming console. Owners of programming, including HBO and CBS, launched standalone online services.
The potential for increased consumer welfare as a result of these market developments was obvious – greater competition and potential competition leading to lower prices, greater output and new innovation. In other words, for the first time, multiple OVD services were launching or planning to launch services to provide consumers the ability to stream live, linear programming, including sports, as part of packages that threatened revenue streams derived from traditional Pay TV packages. In general, these new offerings may allow consumers to purchase smaller bundles or view current programming without the need for a contract with a cable company containing the traditional bundle or a traditional set-top box.
We understood that entrants are particularly vulnerable when competition is nascent. Thus, staff was particularly concerned that this transaction could damage competition in the video distribution industry by increasing both Comcast’s incentive and its ability to disadvantage OVDs and thus retard or permanently stunt the growth of a competitive OVD industry. In doing so, consumers would be denied the benefits that innovative competition could bring.
We looked at theory and we looked at facts and we arrived at a series of important conclusions about the nature of the marketplace and competition.
First, we concluded that the following was not outcome-determinative: that there was minimal horizontal overlap between the Applicants in the local markets for residential broadband and Pay TV services. This is important. At the outset of the merger review, some commenters said there could be no competitive issue given the lack of horizontal competition in those markets. But we concluded that assessment of the net impact of the proposed transaction required a wider aperture.
Second, we determined that our analysis needed to take into account the fact that both firms participated in national distribution markets, one for broadband distribution and another for Pay TV distribution. While the merging parties did not compete directly in the distribution of programming to consumers in local markets, OVDs do seek to distribute programming throughout the U.S., and negotiate for nationwide distribution rights. The ability of the larger merged firm to limit OVD distribution of programming nationwide, for example by negotiating contractual provisions that inhibited an OVD’s ability to obtain nationwide online distribution rights, was carefully examined. Similarly, we also considered a national market for interconnection in which ISPs negotiate with OVDs (and their content delivery networks) over the terms by which the OVDs would reach consumers. Post-transaction, an OVD might have needed an interconnection agreement with the merged entity in order to achieve national distribution, so we also considered the ability of the merged company to impose terms that would disadvantage the OVD.
Third, staff concluded that, with these markets in mind, the combination of video and broadband distribution assets could increase the merged entity's incentives and abilities to take actions against rivals that would pose a competitive threat to online video entry – that is, current and potential competition. Increased incentives are a direct result of the increased footprint of the merged firm. Without the merger, a company taking action against OVDs for the benefit of the Pay TV system as a whole would incur costs but gain additional sales – or protect existing sales – only within its footprint. But the combined entity, having a larger footprint, would internalize more of the external “benefits” provided to other industry members.
Alongside incentives came ability. Increased bargaining power was the central concern. The combination of distribution assets had the potential to increase the merged entity's bargaining power in both national markets – the market where video distributors negotiate the terms and conditions to distribute video content for programmers and the interconnection market through which broadband providers provide mass-market delivery services to OVDs. Because OVDs are subject to national economies of scale, the merged company could significantly impair an OVD’s ability to compete.
Consider the circumstance of a new OVD. Success, and the scale necessary for success, might not require access to every consumer in the country, but foreclosure from big swaths of the nation could erect a significant barrier to OVD entry. Suppose there were two cable companies supplying broadband services, East and West, each with 50% of the nation and imagine that an OVD could be financially successful by reaching 50% of American households. Prior to a merger of East and West, an OVD would be successful if it was able to compete in either territory. Having two alternative interconnection partners gives an OVD the potential ability to play Cable East and Cable West off each other. But after a merger, that OVD would have to strike a bargain with only one firm, which would give that company the ability to disadvantage the OVD, or perhaps even exclude the OVD from reaching its subscribers.
Fourth, we looked at how any greater ability might be used, and here we came to another, separate conclusion. The effects of the transaction on the national markets for video programming and interconnection were significant in our analysis, each considered independently. But we also considered them among the other levers available to the merged firm that, combined, presented a risk of competitive harm. For example, we considered their competitive effect when combined with data caps and other retail broadband terms and conditions that raised the price of OVDs for consumers.
Staff consideration of the cumulative impact of these levers on competition is itself a critical point. The question was not only whether a single kind of action – access to devices, or data caps or interconnection or video programming terms – by itself would degrade competition. It was also whether the merged company would possess the toolkit that would allow it to put sand in the gears of competition through the totality of its efforts. Indeed, for strategic reasons, an entity might have an incentive to spread the effects of anticompetitive actions across multiple forms of actions, and shift their impact over time, in order to attempt to avoid effective monitoring of their impact. Staff did not believe that its concerns could be remedied through conditions.
Finally, the verifiable benefits of the proposed transactions – such as faster broadband speeds for TWC customers, cost savings, enhanced competition for business customers – were viewed by staff as incapable of outweighing the potential harms. Unlike AT&T/DIRECTV, this was not a transaction in which additional competitive choices would flow to consumers. But as in AT&T/DIRECTV, the staff assessed all of these competition issues in light of consumers’ limited broadband alternatives, particularly at higher download speeds. As the Department of Justice noted, in language equally applicable to the FCC staff perspective, “the transaction would [have left] Comcast with close to 60 percent of all high-speed broadband subscribers in the United States, strengthening its ability to block the adoption of innovative products, including ‘over-the-top’ video services that threaten the traditional cable business model.”
The FCC staff, with the Chairman’s concurrence, presented these theories and concerns to the Applicants explaining the reasons that they had not met their burden of demonstrating that approval of the transactions was in the public interest, and inviting further dialogue. After listening to the concerns outlined here, as well as important factual analysis that cannot be discussed publicly due to the restraints of confidentiality, the Applicants abandoned the proposed transactions. Thus, the Commission’s work remains incomplete but, perhaps like Dickens’ unfinished work “The Mystery of Edwin Drood,” the staff’s views may be of interest to lawyers, economists and the public generally.
- ECFS Comments Excluding Brief Comments
- STATEMENT FROM FCC CHAIRMAN TOM WHEELER ON THE COMCAST-TIME WARNER CABLE MERGER. FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler issued the following statement today after Comcast announced its decision to abandon its $45 billion dollar bid to acquire Time Warner Cable. STMT. OCHTW
- APPLICATIONS OF COMCAST CORP. AND TIME WARNER CABLE INC. FOR CONSENT TO ASSIGN OR TRANSFER CONTROL OF LICENSES AND AUTHORIZATIONS. Granted the request to withdraw the applications and terminated the proceeding. (Dkt No. 14-57 ). Action by: Chief, International Bureau, Chief, Media Bureau, Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau, and Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau. Adopted: 04/29/2015 by ORDER. (DA No. 15-511). IB WTB MB WCB https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-15-511A1.docx
- Applications of Comcast Corp., Time Warner Cable Inc., Charter Communications, Inc., and SpinCo For Consent to Assign or Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, Comcast / Time Warner Cable Reply to Responses, MB Docket No.14-57, at 7 (Dec. 23, 2014)
- Released: 12/03/2014. COMMISSION RESTARTS CLOCK IN COMCAST-TIME WARNER CABLE AND AT&T-DIRECTV MERGER PROCEEDINGS AND ESTABLISHES DATES FOR RESPECTIVE PLEADING CYCLES. (DA No. 14-1739). (Dkt No 14-90 14-57 ). MB . https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-14-1739A1.docx
- APPLICATIONS OF COMCAST CORP. AND TIME WARNER CABLE INC. FOR CONSENT TO TRANSFER CONTROL OF LICENSES AND AUTHORIZATIONS AND AT&T, INC. AND DIRECTV FOR CONSENT TO ASSIGN OR TRANSFER OF CONTROL LICENSES AND AUTHORIZATIONS. Media Bureau partially rejects objections filed against individuals who filed Acknowledgements to the Modified Joint Protective Orders. (Dkt No. 14-90 14-57 ). Action by: Chief, Media Bureau. Adopted: 12/03/2014 by ORDER. (DA No. 14-1740). MB https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-14-1740A1.docx
- Released: 03/13/2015. 180-DAY CLOCK STOPPED IN COMCAST-TIME WARNER CABLE-CHARTER AND AT&T-DIRECTV TRANSACTION PROCEEDINGS. (DA No. 15-327). (Dkt No 14-90 14-57 ). MB https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-15-327A1.doc
- APPLICATIONS OF COMCAST CORP. AND TIME WARNER CABLE, INC. FOR CONSENT TO ASSIGN OR TRANSFER CONTROL OF LICENSES AND AUTHORIZATIONS AND AT&T, INC. AND DIRECTV FOR CONSENT TO ASSIGN OR TRANSFER OF CONTROL OF LICENSES AND AUTHORIZATIONS. The Media Bureau adopted an erratum regarding order denying related to the modified joint protective orders in the Comcast-Time Warner Cable-Charter and AT&T-DIRECTV proceedings. (Dkt No. 14-90 14-57 ). Action by: Chief, Media Bureau. Adopted: 11/10/2014 by ORDER. (DA No. 14-1631). MB https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-14-1631A1.docx
- APPLICATIONS OF COMCAST CORP. AND TIME WARNER CABLE, INC. FOR CONSENT TO ASSIGN OR TRANSFER CONTROL OF LICENSES AND AUTHORIZATIONS AND AT&T, INC. AND DIRECTV FOR CONSENT TO ASSIGN OR TRANSFER CONTROL OF LICENSES AND AUTHORIZATIONS. The Media Bureau adopts an order stopping 180-day clock in the Comcast-Time Warner Cable-Charter and AT&T-DIRECTV transaction proceedings. (Dkt No. 14-90 14-57 ). Action by: Chief, Media Bureau. Adopted: 10/22/2014 by ORDER. (DA No. 14-1523). MB https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-14-1523A1.docx
- Released: 10/03/2014. COMMISSION ANNOUNCES EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE REPLIES TO RESPONSES AND OPPOSITIONS FOR ITS REVIEW OF APPLICATIONS OF COMCAST CORPORATION, TIME WARNER CABLE, INC., CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,. (DA No. 14-1446). (Dkt No 14-57 ) AND SPINCO TO ASSIGN AND TRANSFER CONTROL OF FCC LICENSES AND OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS; Replies to Responses/Oppositions Due: 10/29/2014. MB . https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-14-1446A1.docx
- APPLICATIONS OF COMCAST CORP., TIME WARNER CABLE INC., CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., AND SPINCO FOR CONSENT TO ASSIGN OR TRANSFER CONTROL OF LICENSES AND AUTHORIZATIONS. Denied the Request for Extension of Time filed by Office of the Mayor of the City of Los Angeles in the Comcast-Time Warner Cable-Charter transaction proceeding. (Dkt No. 14-57 ). Action by: Chief, Media Bureau. Adopted: 08/22/2014 by ORDER. (DA No. 14-1226). MB WCB https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-14-1226A1.doc
- Released: 07/10/2014. COMMISSION SEEKS COMMENT ON APPLICATIONS OF COMCAST CORPORATION, TIME WARNER CABLE INC., CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., AND SPINCO TO ASSIGN AND TRANSFER CONTROL OF FCC LICENSES AND OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS. (DA No. 14-986). (Dkt No 14-57 ) Petitions Due: 08/25/2014; Responses to Comments/Oppositions to Petitions Due: 09/23/2014; Replies to Responses/Oppositions Due: 10/08/2014. Comments Due: 08/25/2014. MB WCB . Contact: Marcia Glauberman at 7046 or Matthew Warner at 2419, 2555 or 835-5322. News Media Contact: Janice Wise at 8165 https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-14-986A1.docx
- Released: 04/08/2014. COMMISSION ANNOUNCES THAT THE APPLICATIONS PROPOSING THE TRANSFER OF CONTROL OF THE LICENSES AND AUTHORIZATIONS HELD BY TIME WARNER CABLE, INC. AND ITS SUBSIDIARIES TO COMCAST CORP. HAVE BEEN FILED AND PERMIT-BUT-DISCLOSE EX PARTE PROCEDURES NOW APPLY. (DA No. 14-479). (Dkt No 14-57 ). MB http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-14-479A1.doc
- May 08 2014 Hearing: Oversight Hearing on “Competition in the Video and Broadband Markets: the Proposed Merger of Comcast and Time Warner Cable” 2141 Rayburn House Office Building 9:30 a.m.
- Senate Judiciary Committee: Examining the Comcast-Time Warner Cable Merger and the Impact on Consumers Full Committee Date: Wednesday, April 9, 2014 Time: 10:00 AM Location: Hart 216
- Jon Brodkin, Comcast: No Promise that Prices Will Go Down or Even Increase Less Rapidly, ArsTechnica (Feb. 13, 2014),
- Mark Cooper, Buyer and Bottleneck Market Power Make Comcast-Time Warner Merger "Unapprovable Consumer Federation of America, at 6 (2014)
Comcast / NBC Merger
- Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company, and NBC Universal, Inc. for Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees, MB Docket No. 10-56, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 26 FCC Rcd 4238 (2011)
- 1/18/11 FCC Grants Approval of Comcast-NBCU Transaction News Release: Word | Acrobat
MO&O (1/20/11) (as corrected): Word
Genachowski Statement: Word | Acrobat
Copps Statement: Word | Acrobat
McDowell and Baker Joint Statement: Word | Acrobat
Clyburn Statement: Word | Acrobat
- Comcast NewsRoom
News Release: Word | Acrobat: Today, the Federal Communications Commission grants—with conditions and enforceable commitments—approval of the assignment and transfer of control of broadcast, satellite, and other radio licenses from General Electric Company (GE) to Comcast Corporation. The approval will allow GE and Comcast to create a joint venture involving NBC Universal, Inc. (NBCU) and Comcast. An Order further explaining the Commission’s reasoning and the conditions and commitments will be issued shortly...
As part of the merger, Comcast-NBCU will be required to take affirmative steps to foster competition in the video marketplace. In addition, Comcast-NBCU will increase local news coverage to viewers; expand children's programming; enhance the diversity of programming available to Spanish-speaking viewers; offer broadband services to low-income Americans at reduced monthly prices; and provide high-speed broadband to schools, libraries and underserved communities, among other public benefits.
More specifically, the conditions imposed by the Commission address potential harms posed by the combination of Comcast, the nation’s largest cable operator and Internet service provider, and NBCU, which owns and develops some of the most valuable television and film content. These targeted conditions and commitments, which generally will remain in effect for seven years, include:...
• Protecting the Development of Online Competition. Recognizing the risks this transaction could present to the development of innovative online video distribution services, the Commission has adopted conditions designed to guarantee bona fide online distributors the ability to obtain Comcast-NBCU programming in appropriate circumstances. These conditions respond directly to the concerns voiced by participants in the proceeding—including consumer advocates, online video distributors (OVDs), and MVPDs —while respecting the legitimate business interests of the Applicants to protect the value of their content. ...
The Applicants have also made a number of additional voluntary commitments, many of which the Commission has adopted as conditions to the transaction’s approval. Most of these commitments are geared towards enhancing the public interest as a result of the joint venture. These commitments include:
- Broadband Adoption and Deployment. Comcast will make available to approximately 2.5 million low income households: (i) high-speed Internet access service for less than $10 per month; (ii) personal computers, netbooks, or other computer equipment at a purchase price below $150; and (iii) an array of digital-literacy education opportunities. Comcast will also expand its existing broadband networks to reach approximately 400,000 additional homes, provide broadband Internet access service in six additional rural communities, and provide free video and high-speed Internet service to 600 new anchor institutions, such as schools and libraries, in underserved, low-income areas.
Comcast / NBCU Merger Conditions
- Open Internet Commitment
- Para 94: "To address these transaction-related concerns, the Applicants have offered a number of voluntary commitments. The Applicants have agreed that, in their provision of broadband Internet access services, neither Comcast nor Comcast-NBCU shall prioritize affiliated Internet content over unaffiliated Internet content. In addition, any Comcast or Comcast-NBCU broadband Internet access service offering that involves caps, tiers, metering, or other usage-based pricing shall not treat affiliated network traffic differently from unaffiliated network traffic. Comcast and Comcast-NBCU shall also comply with all relevant FCC rules, including the rules adopted by the Commission in GN Docket No. 09-191, and, in the event of any judicial challenge affecting the latter, Comcast-NBCU’s voluntary commitments concerning adherence to those rules will be in effect."
 Letter from Kathy A. Zachem, Vice President, Regulatory and State Legislative Affairs for Comcast Corporation, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC (Jan. 17, 2011).
 Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, Report and Order, FCC 10-201 (rel. Dec. 23, 2010).
 We will rely upon Comcast-NBCU’s agreement to adhere to the terms of the Open Internet rules, including submission to enforcement by the Commission. This agreement contains voluntary, enforceable commitments but is not a general statement of Commission policy and does not alter Commission precedent or bind future Commission policy or rules. See, e.g., In re Applications Filed by Frontier Communications Corporation and Verizon Communications Inc. for Assignment or Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 25 FCC Rcd 5972, 5984 n.79 (2010); In re Applications Filed for the Transfer of Control of Embarq Corporation to CenturyTel, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 24 FCC Rcd 8741, 8745 n.29 (2009).
- Competitive Impact Statement, United Stales v. Comcast Corp., General Electric Co., and NBC Universal, Inc., Case No. 1:1 l-cv-00106, at 37 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2011). "Comcast-NBCU will have the incentive and ability to discriminate against, thwart the development of, or otherwise take anticompetitive actions against OVDs."
- Compliance with OI incorporated into DOJ order. Final Judgment, United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 1:1 1-cv-00106, at 22-23 (Sept. 1,2011).
- Tim Arango & Brian Stelter, Comcast Receives Approval for NBC Universal Merger, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2011)
"On March 22, 2011, a Comcast outage in 19 New Hampshire communities beginning around 3:30 p.m. left many Comcast customers in those communities unable to make any calls, including 9-1-1 calls. The problem lasted through the evening. "
"In March 2010, Comcast Internet and Digital Voice service was disrupted to customers in Nashville, Tennessee, and Atlanta, Georgia. Comcast customers experienced severely degraded service for at least two hours. During the outage, local, state, and Federal government department and agency customers of Comcast in the affected areas were unable to make or receive telephone calls. Residential and business subscribers to Comcast Internet and Digital Voice services also were affected by the outage significantly impairing their ability to engage in 9-1-1 and other communications."
- Comcast Earnings Release Feb. 3, 2016
- $74,510,000 revenue 2015 ("Revenue for Cable Communications increased 5.9% to $12.0 billion in the fourth quarter of 2015 compared to $11.3 billion in the fourth quarter of 2014, driven by increases of 9.8% in high-speed Internet, 4.4% in video and 18.9% in business services,")
- $21,526,000 Video
- $12,471,000 high speed internet
- $3,608 Voice
- $4742 Business Services
- 27,701,000 Customer Relationships
- 22,347,000 video
- 23,329,000 high speed internet (note that this exceeds the video number)
- 11,475,000 voice
- Number Play Customers
- 8,366,000 Single Play
- 9,221,000 Double
- 10,114 Triple
- Nearly 1.2 Million Add Broadband in the First Quarter of 2014, Leichtman Research Group (May 20, 2014), ("In 2014, the top 17 BIAS providers represented 93% of the market. The top providers were Comcast (21 million subscribers), AT&T (17 m), Time Warner Cable (now part of Charter, 12 m), Verizon (9 m), Centurylink, (6 m), Charter (5 m), and Cablevision (3 m).")
- Comcast, SEC Form 10-K for the Year Ended December 31, 2013 (21.7 m video subscribers)
Online Video Delivery
- See Netflix conflict
- "Xfinity Streampix is an online on demand media streaming service offered by Comcast that launched on February 23, 2012 with shows from ABC, NBC, Scripps, Cookie Jar and Lionsgate as well as movies from Sony Pictures, Universal, Snag, Disney and Warner Bros. The service is designed to compete with other online streaming services such as Netflix, Amazon Instant Video, and Hulu. The service costs $4.99 per month, while Comcast customers who subscribe to Internet Plus, Blast Plus, HD Preferred Plus XF Triple Play, HD Premier XF Triple Play or HD Complete XF Triple Play packages receive access to the service at no additional charge." Wikipedia
- Comcast Planning Nationwide Internet Video Service, DSLReports May 1, 2015
- VoIP Trials (primarily to "friendlies")
- Comcast's VoIP Rollout Looks To Replace Carrier Voice Service, Americas Network 6/14/2005
- Comcast pushes VoIP to prime time, CNET 1/11/2005
- Comcast moves into phone service, NWFusion 1/11/2005
- 2015 Comcast TWC merger blocked
- 2014 FCC Interconnection Inquiry
- 2011 Comcast / NBCU Merger
- 2010 Interconnection dispute with Netflix goes public
- 2007 Comcast / BitTorrent Controversy
- Comcast acquires AT&T Broadband
- Comcast and Cox withdraws from AtHome
- 2001: AtHome network sold to AT&T
- 1996: Comcast "strategic investment in the @Home Network, joining Cox Communications, TCI, and Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byer" [Comcast AtHome Network]
- Michelle Caffrey, Comcast Q3 Earnings: Broadband Growth Hits All-Time High, but NBCU Struggles Weigh Down Results, BIZJOURNALS (Oct. 29, 2020)
- Comcast Isn't Allowed to Say It Has 'America's Fastest Internet' Anymore Gizmodo Feb 2017
- Shalini Ramachandran, Comcast Results Show Cable's Comeback, WSJ Feb. 3, 2016 (Comcast added 89,000 video subs last quarter; resulting in net losses of subs for 2015 of 36,000)
- Steve Donohue, Comcast dominates 2013 broadband subscriber growth rankings, FierceCable, Mar. 17, 2014
- Mario Aguilar, HBO Go Is Coming to Amazon Fire TV Unless You Have Comcast, (Dec. 15, 2014),
- Karl Bode, Comcast CEO Still Pretending His Company's Horrible Satisfaction Ratings Are Just A Normal Part Of Being So Huge , T ECHDIRT (Nov. 19 2014), .
- Jordan Weissman, A Former Comcast Employee Explains That Horrifying Customer Service Call, Slate (July 16, 2014),
- Chris Matyszczyk, Could this Comcast Rep Be the Worst Service Rep in the World, CNET (July 14, 2014).
- Brad Reed, Comcast's Brilliant New Way to Retain Subscribers: Refuse to Let Them Cancel, Yahoo News (July 15, 2014)
- Comcast Loses More Basic Cable Subs, Adds Broadband - Sees Revenue of $14.3 Billion in Second Quarter, dslreports 8/5/2011
- Comcast adds 144K to bring broadband subs to 17.55 million, Gigaom 8/5/2011
- Comcast Xfinity Featured in FCC Technology Experience Center, Comcast 7/15/2011
- Guy Kicked Off Comcast For Using Too Many Cloud Services, Techdirt 7/15/2011
- Comcast Cap Enforcement a Confusing Mess - One Tale of Crossing the Cap..., dslreports 7/15/2011
- Comcast and Skype Partner to Bring HD Video Calling Experience to the Living Room, Comcast 6/15/2011
- Comcast Apologizes For Threatening Nonprofit Over Tweet, Tweet 5/20/2011
- Nonprofit sees Comcast funding yanked, restored after critical Tweet, Ars Technica 5/20/2011
- Comcast subscribers can no longer reach The Pirate Bay directly., Ars Technica 5/12/2011
- FCC GRANTS APPROVAL OF COMCAST-NBCU TRANSACTION., FCC 1/19/2011
- Comcast wins U.S. Justice approval for NBCU deal, Globe and Mail 1/19/2011
- Federal regulators approve Comcast's acquisition of NBC Universal, with asterisks, WAPO 1/19/2011
- Regulatory Approval Received for Comcast/GE Joint Venture for NBC Universal, COMCAST 1/19/2011
- Rockefeller Statement on FCC Approval of Comcast-NBC Universal Merger, Senate Commerce 1/19/2011
- Free Press Denounces FCC Approval of Comcast-NBC Merger, Free Press 1/19/2011
- Comcast/NBCU: Central Casting, Crawford 1/19/2011
- Comcast deal means NBC loses management of Hulu, Lost Remote 1/19/2011
- In Allowing Comcast/NBC Universal Merger, U.S. Government Recognizes the Importance of Online Video, PK 1/19/2011
- Voices Weigh in as FCC Nears Vote on Comcast-NBC Universal Venture, COMCAST 1/12/2011
- Comcast-NBC Needs Net Neutrality: Waxman, Internet News 12/10/2010
- Comcast's Letter to FCC on Level 3, COMCAST 12/1/2010
- Comcast Puts Tollbooth on Net Video, Says Backbone Provider, Wired 12/1/2010
- Political RoboCalls Briefly Cripple Comcast VoIP - Company struggles with load in NH, MA, dslreports 11/3/2010
- Comcast Revenue Up 3.8% on Stronger Ad Sales, NYT 4/30/2010
- Verizon Taunts Comcast For Consumerist 'Worst Company' Award - 'One of the few times you'll hear us congratulate Comcast,' says telco, dslreports 4/28/2010
- Comcast owes P2P users $16; yes, they should take it, Ars Technica 4/21/2010
- FCC's Clyburn Rebukes Comcast for Broadband Rate Hike, MAP 3/12/2010
- Comcast earnings ride broadband, voice subscriber gains, CNET 2/4/2010
- remarks by Brian Roberts of Comcast at State of the Net, PFF 1/28/2010
- Comcast Quarterly Profit Up 22%, NYT 11/4/2009
- Comcast Posts Profit, but Loses Video Subscribers, NYT 8/7/2009
- Comcast/Sandvine Traffic Managment System Evolves - 'Fairshare 2.0' can tackle more users, more quickly..., dslreports 7/27/2009
- Comcast Wireless Broadband Hits Atlanta - And completes San Francisco DOCSIS 3.0 deployment, dslreports 7/27/2009
- Comcast Delivers Healthy Q1 Profit on Customer Gains, Ecommerce Times 5/1/2009
- Comcast Cares Day, Philadelphia report, Comcast 4/28/2009
- Comcast Sues Maryland WISP for Bandwidth Theft - Man uses 35 residential accounts to fuel wireless business..., dslreports 3/31/2009
- Comcast's Massive Public Image Makeover - A kinder, friendlier Comcast..., dslreports 3/10/2009
- Comcast Drops DOCSIS 3.0 On Bay Area - Faster 22Mbps and 50Mbps service arrives, dslreports 3/5/2009
- As Earnings Drop 32%, Comcast Raises Dividend, NYT 2/18/2009
- Comcast Nixes Executive Raises For 2009 - Joins a slew of carriers in trying to manage recession..., dslreports 2/18/2009
- Comcast Struggles With Subscriber Additions - Though met or exceeded most Wall Street estimates..., dslreports 2/18/2009
- Comcast Techs Save 88-Year-Old From Burning Home - Traditionally bad press recently turns to good press..., dslreports 2/5/2009
- Comcast Offers $10 Credits For Porn Fiasco - Probably won't be enough to get junior therapy..., dslreports 2/3/2009
- Comcast Accused of Degrading VoIP Sound Quality of Competitors, Under FCC Investigation, CircleID 1/21/2009
- Comcast Tech Saves Six From Burning Apartment - 22-year-old Jorge Rivera goes the extra mile... , dslreports 12/10/2008
- Comcast: FCC Boss Martin 'Intellectually Bankrupt' - The star-crossed lovers continue their epic romance... , dslreports 12/5/2008
- Comcast Tries To Slow Verizon's Philly Entry - Cable giant works city council to protect home turf., dslreports 12/2/2008
- Comcast raises outlook on strong quarter, Globe and Mail 10/30/2008
- Comcast launches faster Internet plans, but usage cap remains, CNET 10/23/2008
- Comcast To Cut 300 Jobs - Mostly divisional and regional management in Eastern U.S., dslreports 10/21/2008
- Comcast set to double broadband speeds, Tech Liberation Front 10/21/2008
- Comcast v. FCC: Now what?, Tech Liberation Front 9/24/2008
- Comcast: Users to Get 'Fair Share' of Bandwidth, Internet News 9/24/2008
- Comcast E-mailing Customers About Caps - Ahead of October 1 transition date...., dslreports 9/16/2008
- Comcast Sees VoIP, ISP Growth, Internet News 7/31/2008
- Comcast Hit With Another Throttling Lawsuit - This time starring the individual who first discovered it., dslreports 7/28/2008
- Comcast Cares.In a Vaguely Creepy Sort of Way, PK 7/28/2008
- Comcast 50Mbps Coming To Florida - Cable giant focuses on Florida to battle AT&T, Verizon, dslreports 5/22/2008
- Comcast Van Drag Race Injures 3-Year-Old - As if Comcast subcontractors needed any more bad news...., dslreports 5/15/2008
- Comcast Considers Pinching Pipes on Broadband Plans, Ecommerce Times 5/9/2008
- Comcast Nominated for Having Worst ToS - People use the service but don't like the terms, dslreports 5/6/2008
- Economic Woes Fail to Throttle Comcast Earnings, Ecommerce Times 5/1/2008
- Comcast: U-Verse Interfering With Our Network - Mixing and matching technologies can cause problems., dslreports 4/24/2008
- Comcast Suffers Through Major Weekend Outage - Gives Silicon Valley blogger a call, dslreports 4/8/2008
- Comcast Now Forging Packets For All TCP Traffic? - University of Colorado researchers say Comcast practice has gotten worse., dslreports 4/8/2008
- Bits: Comcast to Bring Speedier Internet to St. Paul, NYT 4/3/2008
- Comcast VP: We've Admitted Nothing - Fight with FCC over traffic shaping continues., dslreports 4/3/2008
- Comcast Sues The FCC Over Telco Favoritism, Techdirt 3/17/2008
- Comcast Tests 100-Gig Optical Links - A first for cable., dslreports 3/13/2008
- Comcast to Illinois: I loves Me The Market Power!, Tales from the Sausage Factory 3/10/2008
- Comcast Greets Former Insight Customers With Rate Hike - Hi, welcome to Comcast -- we're now raising rates because we can., dslreports 3/7/2008
- Comcast Injects 9/11 Into Broadband Mapping Debate. Really., PK 3/7/2008
- Sandvine feels the pain, Globe and Mail 3/7/2008
- Comcast pegs Outrage-ometer, Isen.blog 3/5/2008
- Comcast To Sue FCC Over Ownership Cap - Company can now officially challenge 30% ceiling, dslreports 3/3/2008
- Slashdot Keeps Rediscovering Comcast Powerboost - And every time wonders if the ISP is mucking with speed tests., dslreports 2/19/2008
- Comcast Posts Higher Profit - Nervous investors get a gift. company may buy Plaxo, dslreports 2/15/2008
- Comcast's New Terms of Service: A Recipe for Discrimination, Save the Internet 2/7/2008
- Opt Out Of Comcast Arbitration - Assuming you enjoy having your legal rights., dslreports 2/1/2008
- Comcast to face lawsuits over BitTorrent filtering, CNET 10/31/2007
- Comcast Will Fire Employees For Admitting That Comcast Uses Sandvine?, Techdirt 10/31/2007
- SurfCity USA? Not at Comcast, Consumer Affairs 8/29/2007
- Comcast Annoys Customers Of Other Companies - Cutting lines and lacking customer service, DSLreports 8/8/2007
- Retain Your Right to Sue Comcast - Opt out of new arbitration agreement..., DSLreports 7/27/2007
- Comcast To Demo DOCSIS 3.0 This Week - NTCA show arrives in Las Vegas, vendors push capacity solutions, Broadband Reports 5/8/2007
- County Fines Comcast For Not Picking Up The Phone - Montgomery County continues attempt to improve service, Broadband Reports 2/6/2007
- Comcast Apparently Verifies Next To Nothing Before Digging Up A Yard, Tech Dirt 12/8/2006
- Comcast Cable Worker Falls Asleep On The Job, ClickOn 10/11/2006
- Comcast Reports 7% Earnings Increase, NYT 7/28/2006
- Comcast Versus Broadband Utopia - Forced to offer $90 bundle in fiber-fed region, Broadband Reports 4/20/2006
- Comcast to launch IM with video, CNET 1/11/2005
- PR, Comcast Reports Third Quarter 2004 Results, Comcast 11/12/2004
- Comcast: What Fiber Threat?, InternetNews 10/29/2004
- Comcast Buys TechTV, Wired 3/26/2004
- Comcast Bundles TV, Internet for Customers, NYT 3/24/03
- Comcast e-mail systems back up, MSNBC 2/15/02
- Comcast To Stop Tracking Web Users, ap 2/13/02
- Comcast stops storing Web info, MSNBC 2/13/02
- Lawmaker Questions Comcast Exec, NYT 2/13/02
- Firm to stop recording users' web habits , CNEWS 2/13/02
- Lawmaker Questions Comcast's Web Tracking , Wash Tech 2/13/02
- Consumer anger aimed at Comcast, CNET 2/13/02
- 12-3-2001 COMCAST AND OTHER BROADBAND SERVICE PROVIDERS REACH SERVICE AGREEMENT WITH EXCITE@HOME Comcast Newsroom
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