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The headline news portion of this discussion is when the FBI guy is knocking at the door with a search warrant and the one-week-temporary-worker-while-the-admin-is-on-vacation is running about the shop trying to find someone who knows what to do. From the law enforcement officer’s perspective, speed is of the essence as ephemeral evidence of bad deeds dissolves into the ether. [See Cuckoo's Egg] From the service provider’s perspective, that last thing the operator wants is some clueless government thug screwing about a $5 million dollar switch with a $50 black box with two wires and alligator clips coming out of it, and with the name “Carnivore” scratch out and something like “DCS-1000” scrawled underneath it.
Under the 4th Amendment, for law enforcement officers to search and seize evidence, they need legal authority. The more real time and intrusive the search and seizure, the more authority is needed. Note, however, that generally higher authority can get what it can get, and also everything that lower authority can get. For example, an official with a Sec. 2703(d) Order can get everything that a lower subpoena can get.
Once upon a time, law enforcement officers could tap telephone calls without worries. The conception that telephone calls might fall under 4th Amendment search and seizure rules was beyond the technological comprehension of the courts. [Olmstead] A search and a seizure was of tangible things, like property, not intangible things like conversations.
Wiretapping law muddle along until one day a law enforcement officer placed a bug in a telephone booth. This was a public place and surely an individual had no privacy interest here, right? The Supreme Court in the seminal case Katz v. United States concluded that privacy interests attached to the person and not the place; a person could have an expectation of privacy regardless of where that person is. A telephone conversation could be subject to 4th Amendment protection.
As a result of Katz, Congress passed the Federal Wiretap Act in 1969, setting forth when the law enforcement officers could listen into telephone calls and how the rights of individuals would be protected.
Next problem: The Wiretap Act covered “aural” communications (that would be “voice” for those of use who don’t speak legalese). The problem here is that transmissions on data networks are not “aural” and therefore are not protected by the Wiretap Act, right? The Court in United States v. Seidlitz concluded just this. Again, technology has surpassed the law.
In 1986, Congress caught up to technology by amending the Wiretap Act with ECPA. Pursuant to ECPA, officers may intercept the content of communications where they have acquired a search warrant from a court and served it on a service provider where the content is to be intercepted.[18 U.S.C. § 2516] [18 U.S.C. § 2518] [Rule 41] [Phonemaster] “Content” includes the subject line of emails; it does not include transactional information.
"'Contents,' when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic communication, includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication." [18 U.S.C. § 2510(8)]
"Intercept" is defined broadly as "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." [18 U.S.C. § 2510(4)] |
ECPA gives the authority to intercept messages contemporaneously with transmission. [Councilman 201-03] [Steiger 1048-49] [Konop 878] [Steve Jackson]. [But See Konop (Reinhardt dissent)] An email in temporary, transient electronic storage is an email during transmission. [Councilman 2005] Law enforcement officers may gain access to stored communications under other authority.
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DOJ Approval: “One of Title III's most restrictive provisions is the requirement that Federal investigative agencies submit requests for the use of certain types of electronic surveillance (primarily the non-consensual interception of wire and oral communications) to the Department of Justice for review and approval before applications for such interception may be submitted to a court of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing the interception. Specifically, in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1), Title III explicitly assigns such review and approval powers to the Attorney General, but allows the Attorney General to delegate this review and approval authority to a limited number of high-level Justice Department officials, including Deputy Assistant Attorneys General for the Criminal Division ("DAAGs"). The DAAGs review and approve or deny proposed applications to conduct "wiretaps" (to intercept wire [telephone] communications, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1)) and to install and monitor "bugs" (the use of microphones to intercept oral [face-to-face] communications, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2)).”
. . . . .
“When Justice Department review and approval of a proposed application for electronic surveillance is required, the Electronic Surveillance Unit of the Criminal Division's Office of Enforcement Operations will conduct the initial review of the necessary pleadings, which include:
A. The affidavit of an "investigative or law enforcement officer" of the United States who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of, or to make arrests for, offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) or (3) (which, for any application involving the interception of electronic communications, includes any Federal felony offense), with such affidavit setting forth the facts of the investigation that establish the basis for those probable cause (and other) statements required by Title III to be included in the application;
B. The application by any United States Attorney or his/her Assistant, or any other attorney authorized by law to prosecute or participate in the prosecution of offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) or (3) that provides the basis for the court's jurisdiction to sign an order authorizing the requested interception of wire, oral, and/or electronic communications; and
C. A set of orders to be signed by the court authorizing the government to intercept, or approving the interception of, the wire, oral, and/or electronic communications that are the subject of the application, including appropriate redacted orders to be served on any relevant providers of "electronic communication service" (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15)).”
[DOJ US Attorney's Manual Title 9-7.100 - 110 Electronic Surveillance] |
In order to obtain a search warrant, law enforcement officers must demonstrate probable cause – in other words that it is more likely than not – that the search will reveal evidence of criminal wrong doing. The official must also certify that all reasonable and normal investigative procedures have been exhausted and that the facilities to be tapped are owned or commonly used by the targeted individual. [18 U.S.C. § 2518] The court order must also specify
- the identity of the targeted individual,
- the facilities that will be tapped,
- what type of communications will be intercepted,
- the criminal offense suspected, and
- the authorized period for the tap.
[18 U.S.C. § 2518]
Not every criminal act is sufficient; the United States Code sets forth the felonies that are sufficient to merit this type of intrusion. [18 U.S.C. § 2516] Note that this list was expanded pursuant to the Patriot Act to include hacking and other violations under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. [See Sunset]
The warrant is good for no more than 30 days, and can be extended. [18 U.S.C. § 2518(5)].
Examples of types of actions that law enforcement officers may request in order to intercept communications include recording keystrokes or the cloning of an email account.
Law enforcement officers may only disclose the content of the intercepted communications as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 2517. [See DOJ US Attorney's Manual Title 9-7.250 Electronic Surveillance: Use and Unsealing of Title III Affidavits]
Execution of Warrant: “Once a magistrate judge signs the warrant, however, investigators ordinarily do not themselves search through the provider's computers in search of the materials described in the warrant. Instead, investigators serve the warrant on the provider as they would a subpoena, and the provider produces the material described in the warrant.” [US DOJ Search and Seizure Manual, Sec. III.D.5.]
Geographic Scope: Roving Wiretaps: “Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (11)(a) and (b), the government may obtain authorization to intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications of specifically named subjects without specifying with particularity the premises within, or the facilities over which, the communications will be intercepted. (Such authorization is commonly referred to as "roving" authorization.) As to the interception of oral communications, the government may seek authorization without specifying the location(s) of the interception when it can be shown that it is not practical to do so. See United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1644 (1994); United States v. Orena, 883 F. Supp. 849 (EDNY 1995). An application for the interception of wire and electronic communications of specifically named subjects may be made without specifying the facility or facilities over which the communications will be intercepted when it can be shown that the subject or subjects of the interception have demonstrated a purpose to thwart interception by changing facilities. See United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Petti, 973 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1859 (1993); United States v. Villegas, 1993 WL 535013 (S.D.N.Y. December 22, 1993).
“When the government seeks authorization for roving interception, the Department's authorization must be made by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General, or an Acting Assistant Attorney General. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a)(i) and (b)(i).” [DOJ US Attorney's Manual Title 9-7.111 Electronic Surveillance ]
Notice: Notice is provided to parties to conversations after the expiration of the order. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8).
Last Updated: Jan 2004
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