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Filters have found themselves in a wide variety of policy scenarios.

June 2008: The FCC has initiated an proceeding to consider licensing the Advanced Wireless Service for broadband Internet access with a requirement of Internet filters.

Filters function by filtering of blocking based on some criteria. That criteria can be

  • The content itself
  • Tags or labels of the content
  • Source or origin of the content (such as ip number, domain name)

The filters can be built and maintained by private services, who then market the filtering service as blocking pursuant to the criteria of different communities. While some of these service's databases can be built as a result of human analysis and inspection, humans are not capable of reviewing all of the content that is on or will soon be on the Internet. As a result, filtering services rely upon automated criteria in order to develop the lists of what should and should not be blocked. The automated process of identifying inappropriate content results in false positives (blocking of otherwise appropriate content) and false negatives (failure to block inappropriate content). [NAS 10] [COPA II.B.3].

In addition, the effectiveness of filters are limited by the ability of those filtered to get around or defeat the filters.

Filtering services are private companies that select what material to filter pursuant to their own criteria. Those companies generally consider that criteria and the database of filtered content proprietary. They have been criticized for not being forthcoming about what they are blocking or their selection process, resulting in censorship without accountability or due process. [COPA II.B.3]

It has been found that groups that are critical of Internet filters have been blocked by Internet filters:

An early useful report concerning Internet filters is the “Electronic Privacy Information Center’s Faulty Filters: How Content Filters Block Access to Kid-Friendly Information on the Internet” (December 1997) (www.epic.org).

Peacefire recently conducted a review of the sites one Internet filter, SurfWatch, blocked of the first 1,000 working .coms. According to Peacefire, out of 1,000 sites tested, 147 were blocked. Of those 147 blocked sites, 96 sites were under construction and did not have content, 42 were non-pornographic and did not have sexually explicit content and nine were pornographic.  According to Peacefire, this constitutes an error rate of 82 percent. A search of the Surfwatch (now SurfControl) Web site revealed press releases acknowledging - but not refuting - the Peacefire study. See also official government reports reviewing the effectiveness of filters.

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U. S. ____ (2004) (COPA II)

"Blocking and filtering software is an alternative that is less restrictive than COPA, and, in addition, likely more effective as a means of restricting children’s access to materials harmful to them. The District Court, in granting the preliminary injunction, did so primarily because the plaintiffs had proposed that filters are a less restrictive alternative to COPA and the Government had not shown it would be likely to disprove the plaintiffs’ contention at trial. Ibid.

Filters are less restrictive than COPA. They impose selective restrictions on speech at the receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source. Under a filtering regime, adults without children may gain access to speech they have a right to see without having to identify them-selves or provide their credit card information. Even adults with children may obtain access to the same speech on the same terms simply by turning off the filter on their home computers. Above all, promoting the use of filters does not condemn as criminal any category of speech, and so the potential chilling effect is eliminated, or at least much diminished. All of these things are true, moreover, regardless of how broadly or narrowly the definitions in COPA are construed.

. . . . . " Continued

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U. S. ____, slip op. 7-11 (2004). See also Ashcroft v. ACLU, Sec. II.A.3. Least Restrictive Means (Third Cir. Mar. 2003) (discussing filtering as an alternative)

Papers

Access Denied: The Policy of Global Internet Filtering
OpenNet Initiative
How to Bypass Internet Filters
Protection of Children From Sexual Predators Act of 1998 
National Academies Study
  • Computer Science and Telecommunications Board (CSTB), Youth, Pornography, and the Internet (2002) HTML
  • Text of Legislation
    SEC. 901. STUDY ON LIMITING THE AVAILABILITY OF PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET.
         (a) IN GENERAL- Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall request that the National Academy of Sciences, acting through its National Research Council, enter into a contract to conduct a study of computer-based technologies and other approaches to the problem of the availability of pornographic material to children on the Internet, in order to develop possible amendments to Federal criminal law and other law enforcement techniques to respond to the problem.
         (b) CONTENTS OF STUDY- The study under this section shall address each of the following:
              (1) The capabilities of present-day computer-based control technologies for controlling electronic transmission of pornographic images.
              (2) Research needed to develop computer-based control technologies to the point of practical utility for controlling the electronic transmission of pornographic images.
              (3) Any inherent limitations of computer-based control technologies for controlling electronic transmission of pornographic images.
              (4) Operational policies or management techniques needed to ensure the effectiveness of these control technologies for controlling electronic transmission of pornographic images.
         (c) FINAL REPORT- Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall submit to the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate a final report of the study under this section, which report shall--
              (1) set forth the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Council; and
              (2) be submitted by the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate to relevant Government agencies and committees of Congress.
    Text of Legislation

    Summary and Status

    Statistics

    Beginning in 2001, the FRSS surveys on Internet access asked whether public schools used any technologies or procedures to prevent student access to inappropriate material on the Internet, the types of technologies or procedures used, and whether such technologies were used on all computers with Internet access used by students. The 2002 and 2003 surveys also asked about the methods used to disseminate information about the technologies or procedures to students and parents.

    • In 2003, almost all public schools with Internet access (97 percent) used various technologies or procedures to control student access to inappropriate material on the Internet (table 17). Across all school characteristics, between 96 and 100 percent 20 of schools reported using these technologies or procedures. In addition, 99 percent of these schools used at least one of these technologies or procedures on all Internet-connected computers used by students.
    • Among schools using technologies or procedures to prevent student access to inappropriate material on the Internet in 2003, 96 percent used blocking or filtering software (table 18). Ninety-three percent of schools reported that teachers or other staff members monitored student Internet access, 83 percent had a written contract that parents have to sign, 76 percent had a contract that students have to sign, 57 percent used monitoring software, 45 percent had honor codes, and 39 percent allowed access only to their intranet. 21 Most of the schools (97 percent) used more than one procedure or technology as part of their Internet use policy (not shown in tables).
    • Ninety-five percent of public schools using technologies or procedures to prevent student access to inappropriate material on the Internet indicated that they disseminated the information about these technologies or other procedures via their school policies or rules distributed to students and parents (table 19). Sixty-six percent did so with a special notice to parents, 58 percent used their newsletters to disseminate this information, 31 percent posted a message on the school website or web page, 25 percent had a notice on a bulletin board at the school, 17 percent had a pop-up message at computer or Internet log on, and 5 percent used a method other than the ones listed above.

    Source: Internet Access to US Public Schools and Classrooms, National Center for Education Statistics, p. 12

    Technology Measures and Filtering Programs

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